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When we study the eﬀects of education on fertility, it is necessary to distinguish
between setting a target for family size, and the ability to actually reach this target. In
highly developed countries with low fertility, the interplay of these two independent
forces can result in rather complex patterns of education-fertility associations. My
main hypothesis here is that education typically empowers women (and couples) to
reach their personal target for family size, regardless of what the target is. If the
educated women in a given country want to have a family size that exceeds the
average fertility rate in that country, the fertility rate of highly educated women may
be higher than the average fertility rate. The empirical data do not yet show many
examples of such cases. In highly developed countries with high levels of gender
equity, such as the Nordic countries, some U-shaped patterns – in which the least
educated and the most educated women have somewhat higher fertility than the
women with medium levels of education – have been observed. In the future, such
patterns may appear in more countries. But as I argue in this note, this pattern should
not be seen as an indication that education is no longer a key determinant of fertility.
The eﬀects of education on health and survival are more straightforward than they
are on fertility, because the goals in health and survival are always in one direction.
Irrespective of their stage of socioeconomic development, virtually all people at any
given point in time want to be in good rather than in bad health, and want to avoid the
premature deaths of themselves and their family members. This is also the reason
why empirical research for virtually all settings shows that compared to their less
educated counterparts, better educated women have lower child mortality, and better
educated men and women have higher life expectancy. There have been a number of
studies on the relationship between health/mortality and education, and the ﬁndings
of this research leave little doubt that the many dimensions of empowerment that
result from education have real and causal eﬀects on health and survival. (Baker et al.
2011; Lutz and Skirbekk 2014). There is clear evidence that all learning experiences,
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including learning experiences through formal education, change our brains for the
rest of our lives (Kandel 2007). Education tends to enhance our time horizons, and
to inﬂuence our health-related behaviors in a multitude of ways that are mostly
conducive to health and survival.
In terms of fertility, the eﬀect of female education during the process of
demographic transition, when family size gradually moves from a high and
mostly uncontrolled condition to a low and planned condition, is also clear and
straightforward. During this transition, it is evident that better educated women
generally want to have fewer children, and that they ﬁnd increasingly eﬀective
ways to ensure that they have fewer children. The desired family size tends to
be smaller for better educated women than for their less educated counterparts,
because the former group are more concerned about the quality of children. Thus,
highly educated women tend to seek to maximize the life chances of their children
by having fewer children who receive high levels of nutrition and education.
Under poor sanitary conditions and in the absence of eﬃcient health care services,
having a large number of pregnancies also carries signiﬁcant health risks for the
mother. Under such conditions, better educated women are typically aware of these
health risks, and may try to limit their number of pregnancies in the interests
of their own health. Hence, in countries undergoing the demographic transition,
there is a consistent and strong negative association between female education and
desired family size. In addition, many studies have shown that education empowers
women to achieve their lower goals, as they are often able to overcome resistance
from their husband or extended family, and to access relevant information and
reproductive health services (Fuchs and Goujon 2014). Based on data from DHS
surveys in 30 African countries, John Bongaarts (2010) found that educational
levels are systematically positively associated with the demand for and the use of
contraception, and are negatively associated with desired family size. These two
factors together clearly result in lower actual fertility among better educated women.
For highly developed countries with low fertility, there are good reasons to
assume that the generally empowering eﬀect of education also holds, as education
places women in a better position to organize their lives according to their intentions.
In terms of family planning, survey evidence shows that compared to less educated
women, highly educated women are better able to realize their stated fertility
plans; i.e., to determine the quantum and the timing of their births, and to have
fewer unplanned births (Musick et al. 2009). Hence, if the fertility targets of better
educated women in highly developed countries were consistently lower than those
of less educated women, as they tend to be in countries undergoing the demographic
transition, we would undoubtedly ﬁnd a strong and consistent negative association
between education and fertility. However, the data show that the fertility targets
of better educated women are not consistently lower than those of less educated
women in countries where fertility levels are around or below the replacement level
(Sobotka et al. 2015). Hence, the key to understanding future trends in fertility
among highly educated women in low fertility countries lies in understanding their
fertility targets.
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The ﬁgure below oﬀers a possible conceptualization of the translation from the
personal ideal family size to fertility targets and their realization in the form of actual
births. The ﬁgure is a modiﬁcation of the conceptual framework introduced in the
context of the “low fertility trap hypothesis” of Lutz et al. (2006). This hypothesis
distinguishes between the diﬀerent aspects of fertility, ranging from ideal family
size to actual births (as shown on the left side of the graph); and assumes that
there are diﬀerent forms of feedback from actual fertility experienced at the societal
level, which is in turn based on the ideals and the realization of these ideals at the
individual level. In particular, the hypothesis states that a high prevalence of one-
child families in a society will inﬂuence the norms of the next generation; i.e., that
the observed reality may be taken as the new norm, which could cause the ideal
family size to fall well below two children per couple. While there is little empirical
evidence of such a pattern in Europe, where the two-child norm still seems very
strong; in East Asia, and particularly in the Chinese urban areas where a one-child
policy had been enforced for several decades, it appears that a new one-child norm
has become dominant, even in places where couples are now allowed to have two
children (Basten and Jiang 2015).
The ﬁgure presented here does not include the feedback loops; instead, it only
shows the diﬀerent aspects of fertility (on the left-hand side of the ﬁgure), and
some selected mechanisms that inﬂuence these aspects, which can in turn be seen as
having been inﬂuenced by education. The personal ideal family size is seen here as
fully exogenous and determined by culture and other forces, which may include the
forces described in the low fertility trap hypothesis. Next, the personal ideal family
size is translated into a more concrete fertility target. This target has already been
shaped by the individual’s awareness of certain trade-oﬀs and of other life goals that
compete with fertility desires. For better educated women in particular, there is often
a clear conﬂict between the desire to have a successful professional career and the
desire to have children. How this conﬂict is resolved depends greatly on the welfare
system of the society, including on the availability of child care and on the degree of
gender equity. Hence, it is hard to come up with a general assessment of how higher
education contributes to the resolution of this conﬂict. For example, the empirical
data for the 1966–70 birth cohorts show that highly educated women were much
more likely to remain childless in Germany than in France (Sobotka et al. 2015).
Another possible negative eﬀect of education on fertility operates through the choice
of partner. For example, in some societies, and particularly in East Asia, highly
educated women do not want to marry a less educated man, and may therefore have
problems ﬁnding an appropriate spouse for establishing a family.
The formation of the personal fertility target is thus very complex and hard to
predict; and it is equally diﬃcult to ﬁnd a systematic eﬀect of education on this
aspect of fertility. However, the eﬀect of education on the realization of the target,
whatever it happens to be, is much clearer. I am conﬁdent that now and in the future
better educated women will be more empowered to manage their lives in ways that
allow them to actually meet their targets.
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Figure 1:
A simple conceptualization of the possible eﬀects of higher education on the
decision-making processes that lead to actual fertility
Hence, in sum, my answer to the question of whether in the future better educated
women in countries with low fertility will have lower or higher fertility has two
parts: (a) We cannot know the eﬀect of education on fertility targets because these
targets depend on local and cultural conditions, and may change over time. (b) I am,
however, quite conﬁdent that education aﬀects the ability of women to realize their
fertility intentions; and that in the future, better educated women will be able to
better reach their targets.
Therefore, if we assume that in Europe the fertility targets of educated women
will be somewhere around two children, we can expect to see slight increases in the
actual fertility of better educated women, who, on average, still have much lower
fertility than their less educated counterparts.
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